Over the past few years, the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters has deeply influenced criminal law. The United Nations, the Council of Europe and the European Union have called upon States to criminalise certain conducts linked to the behaviour of these criminals, such as travelling abroad for terrorist purposes. These measures have been considered by many as an unjustified restriction on the free movement of persons guaranteed by several human rights instruments. Taking into account that the development of EU criminal law is based on the assumption that every member State has an adequate system of protection of fundamental rights, this criticism cannot be ignored. In this sense, an analysis of relevant case law on the restrictions of freedom of movement is highly useful to understand the position of the judiciary on the matter, and to identify possible difficulties in implementing these restrictions of free movement in national systems.
I. Introduction
Shortly after the Paris attacks of November 2015, the international community began to accept the need to review criminal law instruments to address the phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters. Resolution 2178 of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) was the first international step in this direction. The Resolution compels all States to criminalise certain conducts related to foreign terrorist fighters, such as travelling abroad for terrorist purposes or financing terrorism. Following this pathway, the Additional Protocol to the Council of Europe Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism was adopted in Riga one year later (Riga Protocol) 2 . In 2017, the European Union (EU) decided to incorporate these measures against foreign terrorist fighters through the EU Directive on combating terrorism 3 .
All these instruments share a common feature: the use of criminal measures to prevent and punish conducts associated to foreign terrorist fighters. They also share one main criticism: the lack of respect for certain fundamental rights and freedoms. For instance, the Meijers Committee has declared that the EU Directive on combating terrorism "creates a far-reaching extension of the scope of Member States' criminal law obligations in the field of terrorism that takes these obligations even further into the preparatory phase of possible harmful conduct" 4 . Among the different conducts that should be criminalised by States under these international obligations, the act of travelling abroad is a self-evident restriction to the right to free movement of persons, a right which constitutes one of the four fundamental freedoms of the EU system.
The first part of this study introduces the phenomenon of foreign fighters in Europe and provides a review of international measures that have influenced the content of the EU Directive on combating terrorism. Then, this study examines the relationship between freedom of movement and EU criminal law. The research paper concludes with an analysis of relevant case law on how criminal measures against foreign terrorist fighters should be applied in order to respect fundamental rights and freedoms and, in particular, the freedom of movement.
II. The phenomenon of foreign terrorist fighters in Europe
The departure of European citizens to join conflicts in the territory of other states is not a new phenomenon. The motivation of foreign fighters, however, is in constant evolution and differs from one case to another 5 . During the Spanish Civil War or, more recently, during the current conflict between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, the predominant motivation has been political or ideological 6 . Religion has also motivated thousands of European Muslims to leave their countries to join conflicts in the Middle East 7 .
After the Paris attacks of November 2015, Europe became completely aware of the link between European foreign fighters and terrorism. The intention to perpetrate terrorist attacks includes not only the places of conflict abroad but also their countries of nationality and residence upon their return 8 . In 2016, Europe was positioned as the third region sending more foreign terrorist fighters to Syria and Iraq 9 . Even so, Muslim communities in the countries of destination continue to be the main victims of terrorist attacks worldwide 10 .
Nowadays, the loss of territories by Daesh in Syria and Iraq is causing a "terrorist diaspora" of foreign fighters 11 . In consequence, the return of foreign fighters to their countries of residence is a primary concern for the international community and, in particular, for the European Union and its Members States. Julian King, the EU Commissioner for the Security of the Union, has declared that "the retaking of Isis's northern Iraq stronghold, Mosul, may lead to the return to Europe of violent ISISfighters" 12 . Recent studies show that an estimated 30 percent of EU foreign terrorist fighters, around 1,200 people, have already returned to their countries of origin 13 . 5 For a comprehensive study see A. Reed Despite the reality of this threat, we cannot ignore recent studies about the different itineraries followed by foreign terrorist fighters after they leave their country of origin to join the conflict in Syria or Iraq, for instance. These options include indeed the participation in terrorist activities, but also disappointment in the actions of terrorist groups and the surrender of weapons in order to participate in humanitarian missions 14 . Furthermore, their return to their home countries does not necessarily imply a reengagement in terrorist activities in a majority of cases, although the impact of these few exceptions is tremendously high 15 .
III. Previous international measures against foreign terrorist fighters

A. UNSC Resolution 2178
The International Criminal Police Organization (INTERPOL) was the first international organization to address the issue of foreign fighters joining terrorist organizations 16 . However, the term "foreign terrorist fighters" only became widespread after UNSC Resolution 2178 which defines foreign terrorist fighters as "nationals who travel or attempt to travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, and other individuals who travel or attempt to travel from their territories to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, including in connection with armed conflicts" 17 .
In its Resolution 2178, the UNSC expressed its concerns about the fact that "foreign terrorist fighters increase the intensity, duration and intractability of conflicts, and also may pose a serious threat to their States of origin, the States they transit and the States to which they travel, as well as States neighbouring zones of armed conflict in which foreign terrorist fighters are active and that are affected by serious security burdens", as well as it noted that "the threat of foreign terrorist fighters may affect all regions and Member States, even those far from conflict zones"
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. As a result, the UNSC called upon all Member States to adopt measures to combat this phenomenon. Among the State's different obligations, some make specific references to the "travel" and "movement" of foreign terrorist fighters:
• Prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by effective border controls and controls on issuance of identity papers and travel documents, and through measures for preventing counterfeiting, forgery or fraudulent use of identity papers and travel document (paragraph 2).
• Intensify and accelerate the exchange of operational information regarding actions or movements of terrorists or terrorist networks (paragraph 3).
• Cooperate in efforts to address the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters, including by preventing the radicalization to terrorism and recruitment of foreign terrorist fighters, and preventing financial support to foreign terrorist fighters (paragraph 4).
• Prevent and suppress the recruiting, organizing, transporting or equipping of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training, and the financing of their travel and of their activities (paragraph 5).
• Ensure that any person who participates in the financing, planning, preparation or perpetration of terrorist acts or in supporting terrorist acts is brought to justice, and that all States shall ensure that their domestic laws and regulations establish serious criminal offenses sufficient to provide the ability to prosecute and to penalize in a manner duly reflecting the seriousness of the offense (paragraph 6): a) their nationals who travel or attempt to travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, and other individuals who travel or attempt to travel from their territories to a State other than their States of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts, or the providing or receiving of terrorist training; b) the wilful provision or collection, by any means, directly or indirectly, of funds by their nationals or in their territories with the intention that the funds should be used, or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in order to finance the travel of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training; and, c) The wilful organization, or other facilitation, including acts of recruitment, by their nationals or in their territories, of the travel of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training; • Prevent the entry into or transit through their territories of any individual about whom that State has credible information that provides reasonable grounds to believe that he or she is seeking entry into or transit through their territory for the purpose of participating in the acts described in paragraph 6 (paragraph 8).
UNSC Resolution 2178 has been, along with UNSC Resolutions 1373 and 2249, one of the most commented texts by the literature specialized on terrorism and international law. In order to avoid an excessive expansion of the scope of this study, we will focus exclusively on issues concerning the free movement of persons. In this regard, the first and most basic obligation imposed of States is the prevention of entry and departure of foreign terrorist fighters from and to their territories. The problem here stands out by itself: how can be detected an alleged terrorist who has not manifested yet his intentions? Or, as KAMBOS expresses in more concrete terms: "how can it be determined whether a person is travelling to Turkey as a tourist or is only using Turkey as a transit country to join IS in Iraq or Syria?"
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. The Resolution relies on "credible information" as the basis for "reasonable grounds to believe" (paragraph 8) that the person in question is pursuing a terrorist purpose, an assessment which must not be "based on stereotypes founded on grounds of discrimination prohibited by international law" (paragraph 2).
In addition to this general obligation of controlling the movement of foreign terrorist fighters, paragraph 6 contains the duty to criminalize certain conducts, in what SCHEININ has defined as the "most alarming provision" of this Resolution 20 . For this author and many others, this expansion of criminal law responses and the lack of definition of terrorism act as an "open door" for "oppressive regimes that choose to stigmatize as 'terrorism' whatever they do not like -for instance political opposition, trade unions, religious movements, minority groups, etc" 21 .
In particular, the criminalization of conducts such as "the travel or attempt to travel" for terrorist purposes, as well as its financing, organization or facilitation, raises important concerns about its impact on the freedom of movement, the right to return to one's country of nationality and the freedom of entry into a State 22 . The wording of this obligation can even lead to a de facto prohibition to travel to countries affected by terrorist violence. And this is not a mere hypothesis: the last amendment to the Australian counter-terrorism law (the "Foreign Fighter Bill") establishes that "a person commits an offence if enters, or remains, in an area of a foreign country" that has been declared by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs as an area in which "a listed terrorist organization is engaging in terrorist activity", with the exception of entering or remaining solely for the legitimate purposes enlisted in the amendment 23 .
B. The Riga Protocol
Two As a result of nine months of work at the COD-CTE, the Riga Protocol was adopted. This instrument calls upon State Parties to criminalize the conducts of: participating in an association or group for the purpose of terrorism (article 2); receiving training for terrorism (art. 3); travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism (art. 4); funding travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism (art. 5); and organizing or otherwise facilitating travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism (art. 6).
Taking into account that the content of the Riga Protocol is quite similar to the provisions of UNSC Resolution 2178, the criticism against it follows the same pathway. For SCHEININ, "Council of Europe member states have a legal obligation to implement UNSC Res. 2178 (despite the problems in the drafting of that resolution), but sloppy drafting of implementing legislation at the European level will only aggravate the problems inherent in the resolution itself" 26 . And these problems are especially grave if we consider that the Riga Protocol "seeks to address form of conduct, such as foreign travel, that are routinely exercised by law-abiding people for legitimate reasons"
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.
Several NGOs such as Amnesty International and the International Commission of
Jurists have focused precisely on issues regarding the criminalization on travelling. Article 4 of the Riga Protocol engage "the right to freedom of movement, which includes the freedom to leave any country, including one's own. Under Article 2 of Protocol 4 ECHR, and Article 12 ICCPR, the right to leave one's country may be limited only where strictly necessary and proportionate" 28 . In order to ensure the necessity and proportionality of these measures, they would have to comply with the principle of legality and, at the same time, to avoid arbitrary and discriminatory application in practice. In this sense, the offence of "travelling abroad for the purpose of terrorism" should require a clearly demonstrated intent to commit or otherwise participate in the commission of a criminal act.
Fully aware of the previous criticism, the drafters decided that every act criminalized according to the Riga Protocol should be committed "unlawfully and intentionally". These two concepts are not defined in the Protocol but in its Explanatory Report 29 . A report which clarifies, first of all, "that the obligation to adopt, where necessary, criminal offences for certain conduct does not require the Parties to establish self- standing offences to the extent that under the relevant legal system these acts may be considered as preparatory acts to the commission of terrorist offences or are criminalised under other provisions, including those related to attempt" 30 .
On the one hand, "unlawfully" refers to "conduct undertaken without authority (whether legislative, executive, administrative, judicial, contractual or consensual) or conduct that is otherwise not covered by established legal defences or relevant principles under domestic law" 31 . In consequence, the Protocol "leaves unaffected conduct which is otherwise lawful under the domestic law of the Parties, such as conduct undertaken pursuant to lawful government authority" 32 .
On the other hand, the criminal offence should be committed "intentionally". According to the Explanatory Report, the "exact meaning of 'intentionally' in accordance with established practice of the Council of Europe in the drafting of legally binding criminal law instruments should be left to interpretation under domestic law" 33 . In addition to this general requirement, "the offences in Articles 2 to 6 require a further subjective element, being either a terrorist purpose (as defined in Articles 2 to 4) or the knowledge about the terrorist purpose (as defined in Articles 5 and 6)"
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. These precisions can be easily identified with the general scheme of international criminal law which distinguishes, within the subjective element (mens rea), between the general intent (dolus generalis) and the specific intent of the author (dolus specialis) 35 . And last but not least, the Report highlights that States "shall take into account that Articles 2 to 6 criminalise behaviour at a stage preceding the actual commission of a terrorist offence but already having the potential to lead to the commission of such acts. The conditions under which the conduct in question is criminalised need to be foreseeable with legal certainty […] . As always, the principle of the presumption of innocence should be respected, and the burden of proof lies with the State" 36 .
Along with these requirements, which are applicable to all conducts, the Explanatory Report gives special attention to the offence of travelling abroad for terrorist purposes and its impact on the free movement of persons. As some NGOs did before them, the drafters "took due note of the fact that the right to freedom of movement is enshrined in Riga Protocol considered "that the seriousness of the threat posed by foreign terrorist fighters warrants a robust response which, on the other hand, should be fully compatible with human rights and the rule of law" 39 .
In order to be fully compatible with human rights and the rule of law, the Explanatory Report makes several remarks. First at all, it emphasised that "Article 4 does not contain an obligation for Parties to introduce a blanket ban on, or criminalisation of, all travels to certain destinations"
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. In addition, two requirements must be fulfilled: "firstly, the real purpose of the travel must be for the perpetrator to commit or participate in terrorist offences, or to receive or provide training for terrorism, in a State other than that of nationality or residence […] ; secondly, the perpetrator must commit the crime intentionally and unlawfully" 41 .
IV. Freedom of movement vs the effectiveness of EU criminal law: general considerations
Because of different legal and political reasons, European Union criminal law has been one of the most controversial elements of the EU design since its formal creation 42 . One of the main reasons is the inherent and at the same time difficult link with human rights, given that "the penal instrument has both the power to protect and to compress fundamental rights"
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. In order to determine how is the relationship between free movement of persons (fundamental freedoms) and the EU Directive on combating terrorism (EU criminal justice measures) we should commence by referring, at least briefly, to the system of protection of fundamental rights in the EU and the actors involved. , expanding the scope of such rights in certain occasions thanks to the mechanism of the preliminary ruling 50 . The role of these three actors in the field of counter-terrorism measures and its impact on free movement will be analysed in the next section.
As we have mentioned above, the main instrument for the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms in the EU is the EU Charter. Freedom of movement is protected under article 45 of the EU Charter: "every citizen of the Union has the right to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States". The Explanations relating to the EU Charter elaborate that "the right guaranteed by paragraph 1 is the right guaranteed by Article 20(2)(a) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In accordance with Article 52(2) of the Charter, those rights are to be applied under the conditions and within the limits defined by the Treaties"
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. In consequence, this right is a fundamental part of the EU citizenship.
Regarding the conditions and limitations, article 52 of the EU Charter recognises possible restrictions to the rights enshrined by the same text, but they "must be provided for by law and respect the essence of those rights and freedoms. Subject to the principle of proportionality, limitations may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest recognised by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of others". The Explanations refer to the concept of "general interest" as including "both the objectives mentioned in Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union and other interests protected by specific provisions of the Treaties such as Article 4(1) of the Treaty on European Union and Articles 35(3), 36 and 346 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union" 52 .
Initially, it was the existence of terrorism, aggravated by the lack of satisfactory means of control and punishment, what was considered as a deterrent to the exercise of the right of free movement 53 . Nowadays, the means of control of terrorism are considered by many as deterrence itself. The main derogations to the right of free movement of 54 . One of them allows Member States to restrict this right on grounds of "public security" 55 . According to the CJEU, this concept covers "a threat to the functioning of the institutions and essential public services and the survival of the population, as well as the risk of a serious disturbance to foreign relations or to peaceful coexistence of nations, or a risk to military interests" 56 . This derogation "must be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned" 57 . In the case of counterterrorism, the CJEU has accepted that prevention of terrorism can be regarded as falling within the maintenance of public security for the purpose of limiting the freedom of movement for persons 58 .
Apart from this general derogation based on public security, and terrorism as a threat to it, freedom of movement can be also limited by criminal measures. The EU Directive on combating terrorism is based on UNSC Resolution 2178 and the Riga Protocol. As we have seen in the previous pages, both instruments have been widely criticised for violating several rights, such as the freedom of movement as protected by article 2 of Protocol 4 ECHR and article 12 ICCPR. The EU instrument has been, therefore, criticised on the same grounds: "the directive requires states to criminalise a series of preparatory acts that may have a minimal or no direct link to a violent act of terrorism, and may never result in one being committed. For example, the offences of participating in a terrorist group, travelling or receiving training for terrorist purposes are not adequately defined. Unless these broadly outlined offences are subject to careful drafting and strong safeguards in national law, they are likely to lead to violations of rights, including the right to liberty and freedoms of expression, association, and movement" 59 .
It would not be the first time that a piece of EU legislation has been declared invalid because of its impact on fundamental rights 60 . In the field of EU criminal measures and its implementation by Member States, the CJEU has established that there must be a due respect to EU fundamental rights 61 . However, the CJEU has "provided very restrictive interpretation of the range of fundamental rights, when they clash with the effective implementation of EU law, more specifically with EU criminal law" 62 . Two cases highlight this trend within the CJEU.
In the Melloni case, the CJEU faced a clash between the Spanish standard on the right to defence and the European Arrest Warrant (EAW) 63 , an act of secondary legislation. Although national constitutional traditions are part of the EU system of protection of fundamental rights, the CJEU considered case that "national authorities and courts remain free to apply national standards of protection of fundamental rights, provided that the level of protection provided for by the Charter, as interpreted by the Court, and the primacy, unity and effectiveness of EU law are not thereby compromised" 64 . As a result, the CJEU precluded the possibility of making the execution of an EAW conditional upon the respect of the right of defence as protected by the constitutional tradition of the executing Member States because. An opposite view "would undermine the principles of mutual trust and recognition which that decision purports to uphold and would, therefore, compromise the efficacy of that framework decision" 65 .
The EAW was also the subject matter of the Radu case, this time because of a breach of the right to liberty and security, to the presumption of innocence and the right to defence. Advocate General Sharpston considered that "the decision does not affect the obligation to respect fundamental rights and fundamental principles. […] . The duty to respect those rights and principles permeates the Framework Decision. It is implicit that those rights may be taken into account in founding a decision not to execute a warrant. To interpret Article 1(3) otherwise would risk its having no meaning -otherwise, possibly, than as an elegant platitude" 66 . In consequence, she recommended that "the competent judicial authority of the State executing a European arrest warrant can refuse the request for surrender without being in breach of the obligations authorised by the founding Treaties and the other provisions of Community law, where it is shown that the human rights of the person whose surrender is requested have been infringed, or will be infringed, as part of or following the surrender process" 67 . Contrary to this recommendation, the ECJ established again that "the European legislature has ensured that the right to be heard will be observed in the executing Member State in such a way as not to compromise the effectiveness of the European arrest warrant system" 68 .
V. The EU Directive on combating terrorism
A. Legal basis and content
In 73 . According to its article 1, this new legal tool establishes "minimum rules concerning the definition of criminal offences and sanctions in the area of terrorist offences, offences related to a terrorist group and offences related to terrorist activities". The Directive categorizes the offences in three groups: terrorist offences (article 3); offences relating a terrorist group (article 4) and offences related to terrorist activities (articles 5 to 12). We can find most of the new provisions against terrorism within the last category: receiving training for terrorism (article (8); travelling for the purpose of terrorism (article 9); organising or otherwise facilitating travelling for the purpose of terrorism (article 10) and the financing of such acts (article 11). In addition, there are specific mentions to the assistance and support to the victims of terrorism (article 24) in line with the EU Directive establishing minimum standards on the rights, support and protection of victims of crime 75 .
B. Ex ante review: the impact assessment
During the legislative process that led to the adoption of this directive, one of criticism was the lack of an impact assessment of this legislation with respect to the EU Charter new EU legislation the Commission has taken full account of the fundamental rights protected by the Charter. Properly assessing any impact on fundamental rights in the preparatory stages of new legislation will therefore not only contribute to finding the most appropriate solution to a given problem, but will also strengthen the defence of EU legislation against legal challenges before the European Court of Justice" 77 .
However, in the case the EU Directive on combating terrorism, the European Commission (EC) considered that "given the urgent need to improve the EU framework to increase security in the light of recent terrorist attacks including by incorporating international obligations and standards, this proposal is exceptionally presented without an impact assessment" 78 . There will be an assessment, but not until the 8 September 2021, when the EC will have to "submit a report to the European Parliament and to the Council, assessing the added value of this Directive with regard to combating terrorism. The report shall also cover the impact of this Directive on fundamental rights and freedoms". This has been criticised by the European Parliament's Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs: "particularly striking is the lack of an Impact Assessment where the new Directive on Combating Terrorism that is to replace Framework Decision 2002/475 is concerned. None of the Council initiatives have been accompanied by an Impact Assessment. The lack of public consultations and ex ante assessments is not compensated by ex post reviews or evaluations" 79 . And, more specifically, the Meijers Committee has considered that "such a rushed procedure does not do justice to the importance of a balanced legal response to terrorism, especially since the proposal concerns far-reaching powers under criminal law that can be exercised at a very early stage and that can have a serious impact on people's lives" 80 .
In line with the words of the EC, some authors have pointed out the importance that ex ante impact assessments can have for the CJEU: "When considering the impacts of a measure for the purpose of assessing its proportionality, the Court is investigating its legal impact. Thus, as any lawyer would do, the Court considers questions such as which changes to the pre-existing law resulted from the measure in question, whether those changes constitute a prima facie interference with fundamental rights, and if so whether that interference is proportionate" 
C. Ex post facto review: judicial responses to criminal measures against foreign terrorist fighters
The EU Directive on combating terrorism has not been challenged yet, and it can be argued that disproportionate and highly intrusive supranational legislation can be made even worse by its national implementation 82 . However, we must not forget the control that courts of justice exercise in specific cases in relation to this tension between fundamental freedoms, on the one side, and security, on the other. Even if the youth of the Riga Protocol and the EU Directive makes it difficult to find case law in this field, it is not completely inexistent. In this sense, we will comment relevant case law of the CJEU, the ECtHR and the domestic courts (more specifically, the Spanish Supreme Court and the special jurisdiction over crimes of terrorism, Audiencia Nacional). This will help to identify a first set of reactions of the judiciary in front of these initiatives against foreign terrorist fighters.
In the recent Lounani case 83 , the main question was whether an application for refugee protection (as regulated by the Qualification Directive 84 ) could be excluded even when there was not a conviction for terrorist offences as such (like the organising travelling for the purpose of terrorism) in the sense of the previous Framework Decision on combating terrorism (which, at that time, did not contain the crime of the organising or act of travelling for terrorist purposes). AG Sharpston considered that the Decision on combating terrorism and the Qualification Directive have different legal basis, and therefore exclusion under the latter is not dependent on the existence of a prior criminal conviction within the meaning of the Framework Decision 85 . However, she recognises the difficulty to interpret exclusions based on acts of terrorism: "But how far does that extension under Article 12(3) go? Where along the spectrum that stretches from a person who is merely shaking a collecting tin in the street to an individual who is directly involved in a terrorist attack as the driver of the getaway car should the line be drawn?"
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The CJEU accepted the outcome of the AG, though the reasoning is mostly based on UNSC Resolution 2178. From this international resolution it follows that the application of the ground of exclusion of refugee status "cannot be confined to the actual perpetrators of terrorist acts, but can also extend to those who engage in activities consisting in the recruitment, organisation, transportation or equipment of individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of, inter alia, the perpetration, planning or preparation of terrorist acts" 87 . The judgment recalls, specifically, that UNSC Resolution 2178 identifies "among the activities to be combated by States as part of the fight against international terrorism, the wilful organisation of the travel of individuals who travel to a State other than their State of residence or nationality, for the purpose of the perpetration, planning or preparation of terrorist acts" 88 . Professor Peers correctly points out that this pronouncement aligns the interpretation of the exclusion clause to some extent with recent developments in criminal law, namely the Riga Protocol and the EU Directive on combating terrorism 89 .
In Tommaso v. Italy 90 , the ECtHR had the opportunity to address, with specific references to the Riga Protocol, the issue of preventive measures, restrictions on the ground of public security and the right to move and reside freely. In this case, a new set of Italian legislation contained new terrorist offences, notably one relating to travel by foreign fighters for terrorist purposes. The provisions allowed for an extension of the scope of preventive measures concerning individuals and property 91 . This national legislation would be in line with the Riga Protocol that "lays down an obligation for States to make it a criminal offence to travel, or attempt to travel, to a State other than the State of residence or nationality for the purpose of perpetrating, planning, preparing or participating in terrorist acts" 92 . In any case, the ECtHR recalls that the Citizens' Rights Directive establishes on restrictions of the freedom of movement and residence on grounds of public security the obligation to "comply with the principle of proportionality and be based exclusively on the personal conduct of the individual concerned, which must represent a genuine, present and sufficiently serious threat affecting one of the fundamental interests of society" 93 .
According to ECtHR's settled case-law, "any measure restricting the right to liberty of movement must be in accordance with law, pursue one of the legitimate aims referred to in the third paragraph of Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 and strike a fair balance between the public interest and the individual's rights" 94 . The expression "in accordance with law" requires not only that "impugned measure should have some basis in domestic law, but also refers to the quality of the law in question, requiring that it should be accessible to the persons concerned and foreseeable as to its effects" 95 . But, what is the meaning of "foreseeable to its effects"? A question of extreme importance that, in a certain way, was posed by AG Sharpston when she asked what activities should be considered terrorists under recent developments in the field of counterterrorism law. In general terms, the ECtHR reiterates that "a norm cannot be regarded as a 'law' unless it is formulated with sufficient precision to enable citizens to regulate their conduct; they must be able -if need be with appropriate advice -to foresee, to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances, the consequences which a given action may entail" 96 . The judges of Strasbourg accept, however, that "such consequences need not be foreseeable with absolute certainty: experience shows this to be unattainable. Again, whilst certainty is highly desirable, it may bring in its train excessive rigidity, and the law must be able to keep pace with changing circumstances. Accordingly, many laws are inevitably couched in terms which, to a greater or lesser extent, are vague and whose interpretation and application are questions of practice […] . The level of precision required of domestic legislation -which cannot in any case provide for every eventuality -depends to a considerable degree on the content of the law in question, the field it is designed to cover and the number and status of those to whom it is addressed" 97 .
Are the new legal developments against foreign terrorist fighters able to fulfil the guarantees established by the ECtHR? In Tomasso v. Italy, the judgment found a violation of freedom of movement, but only because of the lack of proportionality of the measures imposed in that specific case. However, we can find some interesting reflections in the separate opinion of judge Pinto de Albuquerque. For him, these kind of preventive measures are applied ante or praeter delictum, "being based on a highly indeterminate, probabilistic judgment on the future conduct of the suspected person" 98 . His conclusion about them is clear: "the Convention does not provide a ground for ante o praeter delictum deprivation of the right to liberty for the purposes of crime prevention" 99 .
But the spirit of recent international instruments against foreign terrorist fighters (the UNSC Resolution 2178, the Riga Protocol and the EU Directive on combating terrorism) consists precisely in taking what before was a praetor delictum and transforming it into an actual crime 100 . This has been one of the ways of addressing the issue of, in words of Paulussen, "foreign fighters wannabes" 101 . The Spanish Criminal Code is a good example of national legislation amended in order to include crimes such as self-indoctrination or the attempt of travelling for terrorist purposes 102 . What has been the attitude of Spanish courts, with long experience in dealing with terrorism (ETA), in front of these new criminal measures?
Both the Audiencia Nacional and the Spanish Supreme Court rely on Resolution 2178 to apply the domestic criminal code to specific cases, to an extent that makes one wonder about the direct effect of UNSC resolutions proposed by Peters 103 Audiencia Nacional does not have excessive issues with applying these new crimes 104 , the Supreme Court has annulled certain rulings of the Audiencia Nacional. The Supreme Court has pointed out that some of these crimes were not mentioned in the international instruments and, therefore, they must be applied restrictively. Taking into account the extreme "expansion of the barriers of protection" of criminal law done with these amendments 105 , procedural safeguards must not be forgotten at any time.
VI. Conclusions
Foreign terrorist fighters constitute a real threat for Europe, especially after the loss of territories by Daesh in Syria and Iraq. Preventing terrorist attacks on both European and foreign soil is a matter of general interest that justifies the obligation imposed on States to criminalise certain conducts related to this phenomenon. However, general interest is not the only element that should be taken into account. The criminalisation of travelling is a restriction to the right of free movement protected by the EU Charter, the ECHR and the ICCPR. In consequence, any restriction based on criminal law must comply with the general conditions to restrict a fundamental freedom as applied to the specific case of free movement of persons.
The commitment of the EU to the protection of fundamental rights in the development of criminal law requires "not only that rights are would be taken into some account, but also that they would be taken into substantial and adequate account so that measures introduced with fundamental rights to the least extent possible" 106 . This commitment also ensures the own legitimacy of the EU counter-terrorism system: "the constitutional foundation of the of the EU […] perform the fundamental function of granting legitimacy to the EU counter-terrorism law and policy and ensuring its recognition as socially acceptable" 107 .
As we have seen, the ex ante review of the protection of human rights through impact assessments have manifestly failed in the case of the measures against foreign terrorist fighters. We can ask ourselves if this mechanism should not be compulsory in the context of EU criminal law, as it will not only strengthen the protection of fundamental rights but will also add legitimacy to the entire system. In relation to the ex post facto review, both the CJEU and the ECtHR have established that law must provide such restrictions of fundamental freedoms. This refers not only to the quality of the law in question, but also in being able to foresee its effects: it should be formulated with sufficient precision to enable citizens to regulate their conduct. Furthermore, such restrictions must be subject to the principle of proportionality. The CJEU has also reiterated that limitations to the free movement of persons must take into account the personal conduct of the individual concerned. Again, we can ask ourselves if it would not be better to guarantee the highest level of protection of fundamental rights during the legislative process and the ex ante reviews rather than relying solely on its non-annulment by the CJEU and on a non-contested application by national courts.
To sum up, the criticism towards UNSC Resolution 2178, the Riga Protocol and the EU Directive on combating terrorism is focused on their ambiguity and sloppy drafting 108 . The Council of Europe and the European Union have made attempts to address these concerns by clarifying the element of the crimes, mostly in their preambles and explanatory reports. Unfortunately, as far as these international instruments are not challenged, national courts will have to find the right fit between individual rights and general interest in the case-by-case application of criminal measures. Indeed, they are the first ones to avoid these words from coming true: "the real threat to the life of the nation, in the sense of a people living in accordance with its traditional laws and political values, comes not from terrorism but from laws such as these"
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